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Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In 
this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, 
unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do 
with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, 
drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is 
often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of 
oppression. Articulating what is going wrong here helps us to see what to do about 
it. 
In section 1, I identify a gap in the contemporary philosophical literature. In 
section 2, I identify a different kind of gap, to do with how praise is apportioned in 
the real world. In section 3, I try, using the resources provided by accounts of moral 
responsibility, to diagnose the problem with these gaps in our practice. I advance a 
diagnosis that focuses on unjustly distributed praise, informed by stereotyped 
expectations. In section 4, I consider various ways of responding to the problem, so 
diagnosed. In concluding, I point to further ramifications not only for our practice, 
but also for our theorising about moral responsibility. 
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1. The Praise Gap (in Philosophy) 
It has typically been assumed that blame warrants greater attention than 
praise. For example, in Wallace’s influential Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 
the focus is primarily on responsibility, blameworthiness, and blame. This focus is 
justified, Wallace (1994, 61) writes, because “praise does not seem to have the 
central, defining role that blame and moral sanction occupy in our practice of 
assigning moral responsibility.” Moreover, because blame has punitive elements, 
and is condemnatory, it requires special justification. As Wallace puts it, “Given the 
punitive and potentially harmful aspect of these responses [i.e., blame and moral 
sanction] the suspicion arises that there is something intrinsically cruel about the 
practice of holding people responsible that makes it morally suspect” (1994, 61). 
Blame seems to warrant greater philosophical scrutiny. 
Perhaps adding to the fact that praise isn’t deemed worthy of much 
attention is that early characterisations of the “positive reactive attitudes” include 
“approval” (Strawson 1974, 4), “gratitude . . . love” (5), and it is indeed difficult to 
see what might be problematic about these attitudes towards others. And whilst we 
might ask about the aptness conditions for some of these attitudes—gratitude 
certainly can be misplaced—emotions or attitudes such as love or admiration don’t 
seem to be responses to specific doings but rather to persons and their admirable 
traits or lovable qualities. So praise, in response to specific things done, seems to get 
little attention. Indeed, in drawing attention to an asymmetry between the 
conditions for praise and blame, Nelkin (2011) has suggested that it seems strange 
to worry about whether an individual might be harmed by a benefit, such as the 
communication of praise. If people can’t be harmed by praise, our practices of 
communicating it warrant less scrutiny.1 
That much of the work on moral responsibility has focused on blame is 
attested to by the fact that there is an extensive Stanford Encyclopedia entry for 
“Blame” (Tognazzini and Coates 2018) but no corresponding entry for “Praise.” 
What we end up with, as Eshleman (2013, 216) observes, is a literature “largely 
ignoring responsibility for actions that warrant praise and emulation.” Yet, 
philosophers have started to suggest that something is awry. Eshleman (2013) and 
Stout (2020) have suggested that there might be much to learn about the contours 
of moral responsibility from scrutinising praise and praiseworthiness. Both challenge 
the assumption that praise and blame are symmetrical, such that an analysis of 
praiseworthiness can simply be read off an analysis of blameworthiness. There 
might even be questions, Stout suggests, about whether praise might sometimes 
harm. 
 
1 This has been recently challenged by Stout (2020) (see section 3.a below). 
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I want to further motivate attention to praise and judgements of 
praiseworthiness. I do so by bringing to the table a problem with our practices of 
praising (and assigning praiseworthiness). Whilst this problem pertains to the 
assignment of individual praiseworthiness, my concern is essentially with our social 
practices. As Vargas points out, our judgements of praiseworthiness are guided by 
standards of correctness. Moreover, “when praised, we become subject to a distinct 
web of practices and attitudes that reflect an altogether different way of being 
regarded by others” (Vargas 2013, 5).2 It is this web of practices and attitudes, and 
the standards that structure how our moral responsibility system plays out, with 
which I am concerned here.3 
 
2. The Praise Gap (in the World) 
Before exploring another kind of praise gap, I want to draw attention to a 
few features of our social practices of praising and appraisal. The first thing to notice 
about our practices of attributing praise is that attitudinal judgements of 
praiseworthiness, as well as communicative acts expressing praise, are directed 
towards both practices which are moralised and those which are less explicitly 
moral. For example, we praise people for acting morally well—showing great 
generosity in helping others, say, or great courage in the face of adversity. But we 
also frequently praise people for doing well in other dimensions—for example, 
displaying perseverance in applying oneself to a difficult maths problem. However, 
even in instances in which there are no obviously moral norms in play, the kinds of 
traits being praised are typically ones that we take to exemplify some kind of virtue, 
quality of character, or excellence. This makes it appropriate to think of appraisals in 
these domains as continuous with moral praise. Second, whilst for the purposes of 
this paper we don’t need an account of a particular conception of praise, I take it to 
include judgements of moral merit, as well as expressions that communicate this.4 In 
particular, we might helpfully think of it along the lines of Darwall’s notion of 
 
2 Though Vargas, like others, gives very little attention to praise throughout his 
book, focusing primarily on blame and blameworthiness. 
3 Of course the idea of “our” responsibility system is an oversimplification. Even 
focusing on the social practices operative in particular locations (generally, Western 
Anglophone society, and specifically, the US and the UK in the twenty-first century), 
there will be significant variations in the social practices found. Nonetheless, there 
will be patterns found within the dominant practice, and it is with these I am 
concerned. 
4 I include judgements, as well as expressions, because I do not want to preclude the 
possibility of private praise. However it is mainly in relation to the expressions of 
praise that my concerns arise. 
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“appraisal respect,” which he characterises as “an attitude of positive appraisal of 
that person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit” (Darwall 
1977, 38). Such an attitude “is like esteem or a high regard for someone” (39)—
admiration for their courage or esteem for their perseverance, say. This aspect of 
our praise practices aims to track praiseworthiness. But there is another important 
aspect of our practice, which is to cultivate praiseworthiness—our communications 
of praise with children most explicitly have this end, but it is not exclusive to 
children—we support and encourage each other’s moral agency and development 
much of the time (at least, when we praise successfully). Thirdly, praise is not 
exclusively—and perhaps not even primarily—a second-personal practice. Whilst it 
has significance in second-personal communications, third-personal appraisals are, 
as we shall see, also important in social life. These third-personal communications 
can be important both for communicating and finding out about moral exemplars in 
a domain, but they also can have more formal roles in, for example, generating 
ordinal rankings that determine the distribution of valuable goods. With these 
preliminary remarks in mind, I now want to highlight a further key feature of our 
practices: namely, that there appears to be a very different kind of “praise gap” in 
our practices of apportioning praise. 
 
2.a. Khader and Lindauer, “The Daddy Dividend” 
First, some anecdata. Khader and Lindauer draw attention to the annoying 
discrepancies in the way that accolade is distributed between them for their 
respective roles in parenting: 
 
We coined the term “daddy dividend” on one of the many days a 
stranger on the subway told Matt (a white man) that he was the “best 
daddy ever.” The thing he had done to receive this accolade was to 
wear his baby in a carrier, and perhaps not seem utterly miserable 
doing so. By contrast, Serene (a brown woman) has never been told 
by a stranger that she’s the best mom ever, or even a decent one. 
(Khader and Lindauer 2020, 6) 
 
Man does parenting: praise ensues! Woman does parenting: no big deal. Joseph 
Stramondo describes similar experiences, this time tainted also with ableism, whilst 
out with his toddler, who is riding with him in his wheelchair: 
 
I can immediately tell they want to say something to us. “Hey man, 
look at you! Is that your little girl? You’re a great dad! You’re father of 
the year!” One of them tries to give me a high five as we roll past, but 
my hands are occupied; one is on my chair’s joystick and the other 
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clutches Hazel loosely to help her balance. . . . I am celebrated as a 
disabled father and Leah is disparaged as a disabled mother. 
(Stramondo 2020, 8–9) 
 
2.b. “Helpful” Men5 
These bits of anecdata will be eye-rollingly familiar to some of us. And the 
gender dynamics they illustrate extend to other contexts, as confirmed by studies in 
social psychology. Consider the series of studies from Heilman and Chen (2005) 
indicating that men and women are asymmetrically apportioned praise for altruistic 
behaviour in workplace settings. Heilman and Chen (2005, 432) were working with 
two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Engaging in altruistic citizenship behavior will enhance 
men’s performance evaluations and reward recommendations but 
will not affect those of women. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Withholding altruistic citizenship behavior will be 
detrimental to women’s performance evaluations and reward 
recommendations but will not affect those of men. 
 
That is, when women are helpful, that’s no big deal; but when they’re not, they are 
harshly judged for that perceived failure. Conversely, when men don’t show 
altruistic behaviour, that’s no problem. When they do, they are praised highly. And 
these hypotheses were confirmed across a series of studies, which I’ll now describe. 
In these studies, all participants are asked to evaluate a worker—that is, Cathy or 
Kevin—and rate them. They were told this is part of a “360 evaluation process,” so 
their appraisal would involve seeing, and would be based upon, feedback that other 
colleagues have also provided. The participants see details of Cathy’s or Kevin’s role 
and job title, and how long they have been in the job (purchasing, level three 
administrator). They then see feedback from a colleague about that person. The 
colleague has rated them on five-point scales for various parameters, and, crucially, 
in an open text box, has had the opportunity to provide any observations about the 
employee. In that box a colleague has ostensibly written information about the 
employee’s typical work behaviour. In the experimental conditions, the colleague 
had described a scenario in which help was needed, and information on how the 
employee had responded. In study 1 (roughly):  
 
 
5 Heilman and Chen 2005. 
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Oh no! The photocopier had broken, the colleague needed to finish 
compiling reports for the next day, but almost everyone had gone to 
the office party! Disaster! Urgent help is needed with sorting and 
stapling!  
 
Or in study 2 (roughly):  
 
Oh no! Lost computer files! The colleague has a presentation 
tomorrow and needs help inputting financial data from this week and 
checking it over before the presentation tomorrow morning, but 
almost everyone has gone to the office party!  
 
In both studies, the colleague describes how they asked for help from either 
Kevin (in one condition) or Cathy (in another), who were described as either helping 
or not helping. The experimenters are looking for how participants respond to one 
of four conditions: where Kevin helps, where Kevin does not help, where Cathy 
helps, where Cathy does not help. Participants were then asked to fill out a 
questionnaire rating the (helpful or unhelpful) employee (Cathy or Kevin) to 
evaluate their job performance and make recommendations for organisational 
rewards. (In a control group, no information about helping behaviour was provided, 
so participants could only evaluate on the basis of the other aspects of evaluation). 
What did Heilman and Chen find about their participants’ evaluative tendencies?  
 
As predicted by our hypotheses, the tests revealed a difference in 
how women and men were evaluated when they did and did not 
perform the helping behavior that was requested. Specifically, when 
they did not help, the man’s job performance was rated no 
differently, but the woman’s performance was rated significantly 
lower than when no information about helping was provided. In 
contrast, when they did perform the helping behavior, the man’s 
performance ratings were significantly higher, and the woman’s 
performance ratings were no different than when no information 
about helping was provided. . . . Thus, women neither were given as 
much credit for their altruism nor treated as tolerantly for their lack 
of it as were men who behaved identically (2005, 434–35). 
 
Men who helped were also more strongly recommended for organisational 
rewards (salary raises, bonuses, promotions), whereas helpful women were not 
recommended any more highly than in the condition in which no information about 
their helping behaviours was provided. The key dynamic I want to draw attention 
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here is the following: Women help, showing altruism: no big deal. Men are helpful, 
showing altruism: praise be!6 
 
2.c. Superficial Socialist Feminists and White Allies 
In Mediocre, Ijeoma Oluo describes the role of writer-activists Floyd Dell and 
Max Eastman in the socialist feminist movements in the USA of the 1910s. 
Introduced to the movement by women socialist feminists (Crystal Eastman and Ida 
Rauh), Dell and Eastman were, apparently, keen to recruit other men to the cause 
and “demonstrate to other men why they should be socialist feminists as well” 
(Oluo 2020, 54). However, their commitment to the cause, Oluo writes, was 
questionable. Whilst they did speak up for women’s suffrage, birth control, and civil 
rights for people of colour, they also seemed to really like the idea of women’s 
sexual liberation and the opportunities for sexual liaisons this might afford them. 
Their participation in the movement, it seems, coincided with their treating their 
wives badly (including lying, cheating, and ultimately in Eastman’s case, abandoning 
his wife and child). And, it seems their commitment didn’t run deep: later, Dell 
renounced feminist values, and Eastman became a McCarthyite anticommunist.  
Oluo draws attention to this to highlight the double standards in play: whilst 
women in such movements must be beyond reproach, “mediocre, highly forgettable 
white men regularly enter feminist spaces and expect to be centred and rewarded, 
and they have been. They get to be highly flawed, they get to regularly betray the 
values of their movement yet they will be praised for their intentions or even simply 
for their presence” (2020, 62). In clear illustration of this, Oluo writes that in 
addition to being shitty partners, they were also shitty feminist leaders: “Max 
Eastman was a founder of the New York Men’s League for Women Suffrage, which 
sounds pretty cool, right? However, one of the first things Eastman did was make a 
promise to the men who signed up that ‘no member would be called upon to do 
anything. The main function of the league would be to exist.’ In the battle for 
women’s suffrage, in which women literally fought and died, men become heroes by 
simply existing” (Oluo 2020, 56; quoting from Neuman 2017; quoting from Eastman 
1912, 17).  
Pertinent to our point here is the pattern of praise to which Oluo draws 
attention: men involved in the socialist feminist movement merely had to show up 
to be accoladed and praised for their activism. The women involved did much more, 
for much less (if any) praise. 
 
6 Also telling is that women were judged more harshly than men for not helping. But 
my focus here is on the asymmetrical positive appraisals for the altruistic helping 
behaviour. The organisational reward recommendations are also salient; I return to 
this in section 3.c. 
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Fast-forward a century, and Ernest Owens draws attention to similar 
dynamics of misplaced praise within the antiracist movements of 2020. Writing in 
the context of the Black Lives Matter movement in the US, Owens (2020, n.p.) 
suggests that “the sudden resurgence of ‘white ally’ culture needs to be examined,” 
and he asks rhetorically, “Why should there be a badge of honor or distinction of 
merit bestowed on white people who are choosing to address a human error within 
themselves that’s been terrorizing others?” Owens worries about “a culture of 
pointlessly glorifying white people who appear to give a damn.” Instead, he writes, 
one should focus on dismantling systems of oppression “without praise, visibility, or 
being asked to.” Owens’ rhetorical question points to the problematic patterns that 
are our focus here: white “‘allies” do little more than show up (or simply declare 
allyship) and are praised for doing so, whilst people of colour sustainedly engaged in 
antiracism movements, at greater risk to themselves, receive little recognition or 
praise for so doing.  
 
3. What’s the Problem? 
I have introduced the above examples by way of illustrating the general point 
I want to make: our practices of praise are not insulated from social and political 
dynamics. Men are praised when women—especially women of colour—are not; 
white people are praised when people of colour are not. These dynamics will be 
familiar to those who have experienced the oppressive dimensions of them. But a 
failure within philosophy to ethically scrutinise praise, and our practices of 
communicating it, means that these dynamics have not received attention nor 
shaped how we might think about the ethics of praise. But what, exactly, is going 
wrong in the cases I have described? In this section, I start to diagnose the problem, 
before going on to evaluate proposals for addressing it. 
 
3.a. Undeserved Praise? 
We might suppose that we can easily diagnose the problem here, as one in 
which certain instances of praise are undeserved. Lindauer and Stramondo didn’t 
deserve the praise (“father of the year”) for doing their share of parenting. The 
(fictional) Kevin employees didn’t deserve the praise they received for helping their 
(fictional) colleagues.7 Eastman and Dell didn’t deserve praise for their role in 
socialist feminism. White “allies” don’t deserve praise for showing up (four hundred 
years too late, as Owens puts it). That might be part of what is going on here. But 
what is wrong with getting praise that is not deserved?  
 
7 Of course, no such individual in fact exists—the fictional Kevins, then, are those 
undeserving of praise. Note that as such, they can’t really be harmed by it. 
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Some authors have suggested that it is strange to think that there is any 
worry about people receiving undeserved praise. In discussing avoidability 
conditions for moral responsibility, for example, Nelkin (2011) has suggested that it 
is odd to think that one should be able to avoid praise, which is essentially a benefit 
(whereas avoiding blameworthy action, and so blame, seems more important).  
Stout (2020) takes up this point but disagrees, since he suggests that 
undeserved praise might in fact be harmful (and therefore important to have been 
able to avoid). Stout argues that undeserved praise might be harmful because it may 
seem to us mortifying or be experienced as a form of ridicule. But that isn’t what is 
going on across the cases presented here; the unpleasant feelings Stout identifies 
are dependent on the recipient of the praise being aware of its undeservedness. 
Whilst this may be true in some of the cases (Lindauer and Stramondo), it is 
presumably not the case for all of the examples I described. Indeed, in at least some 
of the cases (superficial allies), the concern seems to be that praise is expected. As 
such, the inaptly praised parties are not, on the face of it, harmed in these particular 
ways by the undeserved praise they receive.  
It might be true that sometimes getting too much (more than is deserved) of 
something that is usually a good can be problematic. But I think we need more 
apparatus—than simply the claim that it is undeserved—to explain what those 
problems are.8 The primary source of the worry here isn’t with the wrongful 
recipients of too much praise.  
Moreover, in isolation from other explanatory facts, it is hard to get 
particularly vexed about some individuals getting benefits to which they are not, 
strictly speaking, entitled. It is implausible to suppose that we are under a strict duty 
to praise only in accordance with moral worth. Finally, one might think that, to a 
degree, some praise is deserved here—there is something praiseworthy about men 
 
8 An instructive analogue is to consider the claim, from Fricker (2007,18), that 
attributions of excess credibility—another instance of some getting more of a good 
than is warranted—are unlikely to be disadvantageous, so not unjust. Davis (2016) 
has argued—convincingly, I think—that this claim is problematic. Rather, excess 
credibility judgements can be harmful—e.g., by disrespecting and producing 
epistemic damage—when they trade in stereotypes. But note that Davis’s claim is 
that some kinds of excess credibility judgements are harmful (in particular, when 
attributed to members of marginalised groups based on stereotypes). Some 
instances of attributing excess credibility may not be similarly problematic. The 
analogous point is that whilst excess, undeserved, praise need not itself be 
problematic, it sometimes may be—when the undeserved praise also has other 
features, as outlined in section 3.e, below. These other features, rather than that it 
is undeserved, do important explanatory work in articulating the problem. 
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who go against societal incentives and norms to participate in parenting and 
something praiseworthy about men or white people who speak up against systems 
of gender or racial oppression (systems which uphold them in privileged positions). 
So, that praise is undeserved is, in isolation, an inadequate diagnosis of what is going 
wrong here.  
 
3.b. Useless Praise? 
Crude consequentialists would have a different take on when and whether 
praise is problematic. On this view, we should deliver praise when it is useful—in 
promoting more good behaviour, say (see Sidgwick 1981, 428). In this instance, 
then, the issue would be that praise is being doled out when it is not useful to do so. 
I think there is some mileage in this idea: How helpful is it to be praising someone 
for doing what is basically expected of them as a parent? How helpful is it to be 
praising men for being minimally decent, helpful colleagues? How useful is it to 
praise supposed allies for their superficial engagement with socialist feminism or 
with movements for racial justice? In each instance, I think it is right to have doubts 
about praise being likely to produce stable dispositions to act in admirable ways. But 
there is something dissatisfactory about this diagnosis of what is problematic here.  
For a start, this line of argument is hostage to empirical fortune. It is 
vulnerable to the response that praise really is, in fact, helpful in these cases. 
Against a backdrop of norms and social structures that do not support men 
participating in parenting, say, lavishing them with praise for doing so may 
encourage them and perhaps even work counter to those norms. This may be a 
context where praise has a key role in supporting and encouraging those whose 
moral agency is in development. If it turns out that way, then there’d be no worry 
here.9 
Second, if one shares the thought that praise isn’t helpful in these contexts, 
one might think that there is more to be said about why it isn’t. What is the 
underpinning explanation for why praise isn’t going to promote stable dispositions 
to act well here? And does that have something to do with what is ultimately 
problematic about these dynamics? 
Finally, there is something important in the comparative aspects of the 
scenarios I described: one parent getting praise when the other does not; (fictional) 
Kevin being praised when (fictional) Cathy is not. Nothing in the crude 
consequentialist picture of when praise is justified addresses this.  
 
9 There’s some empirical evidence that praise, construed or communicated in a 
certain way at least, is unlikely to promote stable motives to act well. See, e.g., Deci 
and Ryan (2000) and Conway and Peetz (2012). See also the concerns I raise about 
using praise to shape behaviour in 4.b below. 
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3.c. Ill-Distributed Praise 
A more adequate diagnosis of what seems problematic here looks beyond 
the individual who is the target of praise and takes up the comparative dimension to 
the examples here. What is problematic is that this (undeserving) person was 
praised when that (deserving) person was not. It is the distribution of praise, then, 
(perhaps given facts about desert as they stand across people) that explains what is 
problematic about the cases I have described. 
The idea that praise can be ill-distributed is a compelling one—by analogy, it 
is easy to agree that someone who consistently praises one of their children but not 
the other for like behaviours would be guilty of a problematic favouritism, and we 
would think the unpraised child has been unjustly done by. If this disparity tracks 
social identity, as in our examples, it goes beyond favouritism and becomes 
discriminatory. The idea that there is something problematic about this is bolstered 
if we consider the kind of goods that may be being ill-distributed. Recall Darwall’s 
(1977, 38) characterization of “appraisal respect”: “an attitude of positive appraisal 
of that person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit.” Since 
such an attitude “is like esteem or a high regard for someone” (39), we can see why 
it might be important to apportion such goods—esteem, high regard—appropriately 
and proportionately, without favouritism or bias. This is especially so if the 
discrepancies in praise track whether one is a member of a privileged or 
disadvantaged group, since much has been written on the forms of psychological 
oppression—including low self-esteem—that oppressed people may suffer (Bartky 
1990; Benson 1994; Shelby 2002, 2005). Problematic patterns of praise may well 
compound these harms to self-esteem, then. They may also reflect, and shore up 
social hierarchies of esteem and standing, in the ways Elizabeth Anderson has 
argued are antithetical to egalitarian social relations. Hierarchies of esteem, 
Anderson (2017, 3–4) writes, involve the extraction of “tokens of deferential honour 
. . . in recognition of the other’s superiority”; hierarchies of standing are those in 
which “the interests of those of higher rank count in the eyes of others, whereas the 
interests of inferiors do not: others are free to neglect them.” Patterns of praise that 
track social position entrench both kinds of hierarchy. 
The worry about the distribution of praise gains support from recent work 
analysing the problematic distribution of blame. Ciurria (2019, 2020) has recently 
argued that our current practices of attributing responsibility, and blame in 
particular, serve to absolve perpetrators of certain wrongs—in particular, wrongs 
that perpetuate oppression. For example, men who rape or abuse women are 
“disappeared” from public discourse about sexual violence against women, making 
it difficult to identify and blame them for their role in oppression. Instead, blame 
falls on women for perpetuating their own oppression—for example, by engaging in 
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“risky” behaviour, like having a drink or being outside.10 Men fail to get the blame 
they deserve, and women are instead blamed too much. Is the picture with praise 
symmetrical, such that (e.g.) men get too much praise, and women too little? 
Certainly in the examples I have provided, this is the distribution that is at 
issue. But further empirical research on praise suggests a more complex picture. 
One might think that a problem with the diagnosis that praise is being ill-distributed 
is that a bunch of studies suggest that, in some contexts, women receive more 
praise than men, and people of colour receive more glowing appraisals than white 
people (Biernat and Manis 1994; Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Biernat and Vescio 
2002; Biernat et al. 2009; Kobrynowicz and Biernat 1997). For example, in one study, 
looking at evaluations of men versus women in sports, participants afforded women 
more praise than men for commensurate performances (Biernat and Vescio 2002). 
In another study, the same performance was more positively appraised (as “better”) 
when achieved by a black student than the same score achieved by a white student 
(Biernat et al. 2009). These findings are hard to square with the idea that an 
additional dimension of oppression that people suffer is that praise is 
asymmetrically distributed, such that women and people of colour end up with a 
praise deficit. So what is going on here? 
A closer look suggests a possible response to this worry and fills out our 
analysis of what is going wrong in our examples. There are two steps to 
understanding what seems to be going on here. First, one way in which these 
findings are explained is in terms of the “shifting standards” model, whereby social 
group membership (whichever group membership is salient in a context) affects the 
expectations, or standards, to which one is held. The second step, crucially, is that 
practices of praise are keyed to these social expectations. So, for example, in a 
sporting context, with gender as the relevant social grouping, women are held to 
lower expectations than men (who are expected, according to the stereotype, to be 
more powerful, faster, etc.) (Biernat and Vescio 2002; see also Vial and Cimpian 
2020, 121–22). Where expectations are low, they can be greatly exceeded, and so 
considerable praise is given to women who surpass those low expectations. 
Commensurate praise is not afforded, for the same level of performance, to those 
(men) held to higher expectations. But, in fact, as the studies indicate, we know that 
 
10 Ciurria makes reference to certain public health materials (also discussed by Solnit 
[2016]) in which such narratives are found. The materials in question, specifically, 
set out the risks of drinking to women, which include injuries/violence, STDs, and 
unintended pregnancy. These risk factors are presented alongside health risks such 
as “heart disease, cancer”, with no mention of the behaviour of other parties (male 
abusers or sexual partners) that might be implicated in the instantiation of these 
risks. 
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the praise doesn’t reflect the fact that participants thought the women were really 
better or (actually, unqualifiedly) meritorious: when it came to making selections for 
the team and determining things for which performance actually mattered (batting 
order), the women were not picked or prioritised. So the “excess” praise here, one 
might respond, can’t really be thought of as “levelling up” with the praise inequities 
in the examples I set out. Whilst superficially, more praise is communicated, it isn’t 
accompanied by any of the attendant goods. It does not express genuine evaluation 
of unqualified merit and high regard, or it doesn’t convey actual esteem. 
Or consider the finding that black students were appraised as “better” than 
the white students who received the same standardised test score (Biernat et al. 
2009). This appraisal is indexed to the stereotype-informed low expectations of 
black students, compared to white students, leading to the “wow” factor when 
those expectations are exceeded. Again, the study showed that participants didn’t 
really think the black students were better. When asked to predict future test 
scores, they estimated higher scores for the white rather than black students. So 
again, we might think this doesn’t really address any racialised praise inequities of 
the sort identified earlier, since this isn’t conveying actual esteem or serving as a 
genuine evaluation of merit. So the worry about whether the goods attendant on 
praise are ill-distributed still stands. 
Does this response give us reason to doubt that the praise identified in our 
earlier examples (section 2) is “really” praise? If shaped by, for example, low 
expectations of men who parent, or help, or superficially commit to justice 
movements, then is the praise being talked of there also failing to convey an 
evaluation of real merit or of actual esteem? One reason not to be swayed by this 
thought is that, in at least some of those cases, real reward also follows the praise. 
In the studies by Heilman and Chen, men’s helpful behaviour was recognised and 
resulted in organisational reward recommendations (salary increase, promotion, 
bonus pay). Other studies show that when men parent, they are not only praised for 
it, as in our examples above, but reap institutional rewards that women do not. In a 
well-known study, Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) evaluated the impact of being 
identified as a parent on application materials. They found that equally good 
application materials were evaluated as demonstrating less competence and 
commitment, warranting a lower starting salary, and judged as less promotable and 
less suitable for senior management, when the applications contained information 
that revealed that the applicant was a mother. Conversely, fathers were not 
similarly penalised but rather judged to be more committed, deserving of a higher 
starting salary, more promotable, and more suitable for senior management.11 Both 
 
11 For a more recent study confirming these findings, see González, Cortina, and 
Rodríguez (2019). 
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entitlement to material benefits and various cultural markers of esteem, then, seem 
to line up with the unequal praise in a way that suggests that these instances of 
praise, for those in socially privileged positions, really do track judgements of merit 
and esteem (rather than simply surprise at lower expectations being exceeded). 
Moreover, that these judgements of esteem translate to—that is, justify and prop 
up the unequal distribution of—material rewards is a further reason for serious 
concern about these patterns of appraisal. 
So there does seem to be a problematic distribution of praise—and in 
particular the judgements of merit and expressions of esteem—across people, 
tracking people’s status in oppressive hierarchies. Worse, studies suggest that these 
distributions of appraisal support material inequities. Still, one might think that the 
framework these studies provide helps us in pointing to a deeper understanding of 
what the problem is. 
 
3.d. Shifting Standards and Expectations 
The “shifting standards” model mentioned above draws our attention to the 
fact that, in practice, appraisals appear to track expectations, which in turn are 
informed by stereotypes (Vial and Cimpian, 2020). Part of that seems to involve 
excessive praise when unreasonably low expectations are surpassed. But the other 
part of that concerns unreasonably high expectations. In the context of appraising 
parents, women are stereotypically expected to do more caring and nurturing work 
than men (who are expected to be less present, less involved in the physical and 
emotional care of their families) (Kobrynowicz and Biernat 1997). Where men and 
women were commensurately appraised as “good parents,” however, this reflected 
vastly different expectations—women who were appraised as good parents were 
expected to do way more care work than men to earn that accolade. The overall 
picture, then, is that stereotypes shape expectations, and praise is accorded in line 
with those expectations. In summarising the relationship between stereotype 
informed expectations and appraisals, Vial and Cimpian (2020, 123) note that 
stereotypes can shape not only the intensity (how much praise) but also the type of 
feedback (praise or criticism). Thus, a man might be praised for something more 
(with greater intensity) than a woman or might receive praise for something a 
woman would be criticised for (see Khader and Lindauer 2020; Stramondo 2020). 
This suggests a deeper diagnosis of the problem as one whereby praise is 
shaped by stereotypes, which inform expectations.12 The problem, then, is not that 
 
12 Vial and Cimpian distinguish between descriptive stereotypes (generalisations 
about how group members are) and prescriptive stereotypes (which also contain 
normative requirements about how individuals should be). They note that when 
prescriptive stereotypes apply, failure to conform to stereotype also affects the 
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there is some undeserved or useless praise. On this analysis the problem is that 
there are stereotyped (low or high) expectations, which inform whether or not 
someone is praised for exceeding those expectations. Practices of praise, then, are 
also tracking and shoring up problematic social role expectations. This is an 
important aspect of the analysis, as it reveals the mechanisms by which praise can 
be implicated in entrenching oppressive norms.  
 
3.e. The Hybrid View: Shifting Standards and Asymmetric Judgements of Merit and 
Esteem 
Whilst I find this framework of shifting standards helpful and illuminating, my 
overall analysis (drawing on the argument of section 3.c) departs from Vial and 
Cimpian’s: I have argued that in some of these instances (namely, those in which 
members of oppressed groups are held to low expectations), there is reason to 
suppose that what is expressed does not communicate any unqualified judgement 
of merit or expression of high regard or esteem. My view is that there are shifting 
standards and stereotyped expectations, but that this analysis needs to be 
supplemented by the analysis of the goods that praise communicates as 
asymmetrically distributed. 
Thus on the hybrid view, there are various different problems with the 
patterns of praise I have identified. First, as we have just seen, there are cases in 
which supposed praise isn’t tracking merit or esteem but rather something like 
surprise at having (stereotype-informed, low) expectations surpassed (the 
sportswomen, the black students). These instances of purported praise are 
problematic in masking the fact that these appraisals are not genuine, unqualified 
judgements of merit or expressions of esteem. Second, there are cases in which 
stereotypes inform (high) expectations, such that meeting them becomes 
unnoteworthy for members of the stereotyped social group (women who are 
parents, women’s helping behaviour in workplaces, people of colour’s labour for 
racial justice). Thus, actually praiseworthy behaviour is not visible. In institutional 
settings, moreover, it goes (asymmetrically) unrewarded, entrenching social 
hierarchies. Further, unequal expectations are entrenched, which serves to 
perpetuate oppressive norms. Third, those in positions of privilege—already 
commanding respect and esteem—are sometimes held (perhaps not unreasonably) 
to low expectations also (in particular with respect to their roles in dismantling 
oppressive structures). Moreover, they are—and expect to be—excessively praised 
for meeting or exceeding these low expectations (white allies, the daddy dividend, 
 
global evaluation of the person (e.g., how likable they are). They also note that 
praise or criticism for conforming (or not) to a stereotype is more marked in the case 
of prescriptive stereotypes (see Vial and Cimpian 2020, 123). 
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Eastman and Dell).13 Yet in this case, the praise does seem to correlate with patterns 
of reward and judgements of esteem, in ways which indicate that those in socially 
privileged positions enjoy a monopoly of genuine (if unwarranted) esteem.  
The problem, then, is not that there is some praise which is undeserved or 
not useful, nor simply that there are stereotype informed expectations. Nor is it 
simply that there is some problematic distribution of praise. It is the conjunction of 
the role of stereotyped expectations, and the asymmetric attributions of appraisal 
respect and esteem, favouring those in positions of privilege, that is problematic in 
the cases described. 
 
4. What’s the Solution? 
If this is the problem, then what should we do about it? That will depend on 
one’s conception of what our practices of praise (and blame) are for. My focus in 
this section is on the issue of how to address “the praise gap” in the world, and on 
the theoretical tools available to us in thinking about this. There remain further, 
here unaddressed, questions about the broader theoretical implications for 
accounts of moral responsibility practices. 
 
4.a. Tracking Moral Worth 
We have already encountered the (commonsense) idea that our practices of 
apportioning praise and blame are supposed to track moral worth. On this view, we 
should rectify our practices so that praise—genuine esteem and judgement of moral 
merit—is accorded where it is deserved. That would mean sometimes—in the sorts 
of cases I described—praising women more and people of colour more, such that 
the expressions of esteem and high regard people receive is more commensurate 
with the merits demonstrated. It would also mean ensuring that the praise is 
underpinned by judgements of merit unmoderated by stereotyped expectation, and 
that it communicates genuine esteem. But how much more praise is due? The 
problem with such a remedial strategy is that it is pretty difficult to get a grip on 
exactly how much praise is deserved. Second, this strategy is especially challenging 
 
13 Note the complex intersection of the gendered dimensions of the “daddy 
dividend” with ableism that Stramondo highlights, though. As a disabled parent, he 
writes, he was aware that expectations were so low, his competence to parent 
would be challenged: “There is this presumption that the disabled parent is 
inherently an inadequate parent. . . . The stakes are incredibly high. How long would 
it take for me to lose father of the year status, for example, if one of my kids were to 
be even minorly injured while under my care in public? . . . We believed that it was 
not a question of if child services would be called on us, but when” (Stramondo 
2020, 9). 
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insofar as our practices—including our judgements of moral worth—are shaped by 
socially oppressive hierarchies, insofar as we expect, and communicate that we 
expect, different virtues from men and women, white people and people of colour, 
able bodied and disabled people. If differential standards of moral worth are applied 
to different social groups, then attempts to track moral worth are likely to end up 
tracking distorted conceptions of moral worth.14  
Moreover, as we saw, there are some occasions—in particular those 
concerned with moral development—when it may be important to praise whether 
or not it is deserved—to encourage or support, say. So aiming for only deserved 
praise seems both insufficient and undesirable. 
 
4.b. Shaping Behaviour 
On the crude consequentialist view, we saw that praise was justified if it 
produced good outcomes—increased moral behaviour, say. I raised doubts about 
whether the problematic patterns of praising are well suited to that goal. So, on this 
view, we should revise our practices so that praise really is useful in producing more 
or better moral behaviours. This seems a pretty fraught endeavour to me. One 
might think, as noted, that praise is helpful in getting people to do more of 
something (that’s at least the assumption at work in praising children). But on the 
other hand, there’s some evidence that praise can—under some conditions—
undermine later motivation to act well: this seems to be especially likely when 
praise is supposed to function like a reward, to condition motives for good 
behaviour; or if it fosters compensatory beliefs, such that people feel they’ve shown 
themselves to be morally “good enough” (Deci and Ryan 2000; Conway and Peetz 
2012). This view also faces well-known worries about manipulation, and treating 
moral agents like beings to be conditioned rather than subjects of moral address 
(see Vargas 2013). Moreover, using praise—or overpraising—to encourage certain 
dispositions risks being experienced as patronising or condescending, especially if 
the praisee is attuned to the low expectations underpinning the high praise. 
Consider the troubled responses to the high praise in the testimonies of Lindauer 
and Khader and of Stramondo, above. Understanding that one is being told, for 
example, “You’re doing great—for a father” or “That was an amazing performance—
 
14 There is some literature on the way oppression can shape moral agency and in 
particular the virtues, but as far as I know this has not connected up to the shaping 
of moral agency with practices of appraisal specifically. Tessman’s Burdened Virtues 
(2005) for example, examines the way that oppressive social contexts can hinder the 
development of virtues or can require those in oppressed positions to develop 
distinctive virtues to combat oppression which come at a cost to the self. See also 
Dillon (2012). 
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for a woman” makes explicit the stereotypes involved and thereby how disrespectful 
those underpinning stereotypes are. Further, part of what seems disrespectful about 
using praise for this purpose is that it also suggests that the recipients of praise lack 
the maturity to engage with constructive criticism. Feedback needn’t be praise to be 
helpful. What is more likely to be helpful, and less morally fraught, than trying to 
manipulate with praise, one might think, is a frank discussion of, for example, 
expectations about parenting roles and why they are so warped; or expectations for 
white people about engaging in antiracism and the dynamics of their doing so.15 
 
4.c. Eliminating Praise 
One might think that we would do better to just get rid of these aspects of 
the responsibility system. Eliminativists have tended to focus on the potentially 
problematic aspects of blame, such as the “strike back” emotions that it may involve 
(see Waller 2011, 2014). If praise has problematic aspects, as I have argued, then 
might our practices of praise too be targeted by the eliminativist: we should simply 
give up on our practices of praise. One worry is that this is something of a “baby out 
with the bath water” strategy. We give up on all praise because some aspects of it 
are problematic. Moreover, social life without praise seems a pretty bleak prospect. 
Would it require withholding all of those utterances of “well done,” “good job,” 
“nice effort”? Would it require withholding from judgements that, say, that person 
is admirable, this person courageous, this person kind? Not only would that be 
extremely psychologically challenging (see Ciurria 2019; Vargas 2013), it also looks 
rather undesirable. One would hope that these kinds of judgements and 
communications can be preserved, but in a way that better reflects genuine moral 
qualities, rather than tainted by oppressive stereotypes. 
 
4.d. Ameliorating Praise 
Some have suggested that we can avoid eliminativism and address concerns 
about our responsibility system by revising or ameliorating it. As Vargas (2013, 75) 
argues, “When there is some reason to revise, rather than eliminate, elimination 
looks like a hasty and unmotivated option.” The sorts of revisions that have recently 
been proposed lead us to functionalist accounts of our practices of holding 
responsible, whereby they can be justified if they serve a particular function.16 For 
Vargas, that function is improving the moral sensibilities of those engaged in the 
practice (see also McGeer, 2019). For our practices of praising to be justified, on this 
view, we would have to find a way of praising that really did improve the moral 
 
15 One might think that forward-looking considerations do have some role in our 
practices of responsibility. I consider this in 4.d below. 
16 I am overall sympathetic to these approaches; see Holroyd (2018). 
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agency of those praised—a practice that stabilised dispositions to share parenting 
equally, for altruism irrespective of gender, for genuine commitment to and 
solidarity with emancipatory social movements, say. But this will of course require 
not only changes to our practices of praise but also to social and institutional 
structures so that they, for example, facilitate participation in parenting of both 
parents, enable cross-racial understanding and solidarity, and more equitably 
reward altruism (creating, in Vargas’s [2017] later terms, the “moral ecology” to 
support better agency).  
An alternative functionalist account has recently been proposed, which 
focuses on the relationship of the responsibility system to emancipatory social goals. 
Our practices of blaming can be justified, Ciurria (2019, 15; 2020) argues, if they 
serve the emancipatory aims of an intersectional feminism. On Ciurria’s view, apt 
blame tracks people’s contributions to oppressive systems (it is not agency tracking, 
importantly). This functionalist view might seem particularly promising in application 
to praise, given the considerations I have raised here: apt praise tracks (inter alia) 
contributions to ending oppression.17 But, in addition to applying Ciurria’s 
functionalist view to praise specifically, there is reason to elaborate on it, by noting 
the reflexivity of that norm for praiseworthiness: it applies to itself, and our 
practices of praise should themselves avoid entrenching oppression and instead 
serve emancipatory goals. What I am proposing is that our practices of praise should 
be structured by plural reasons, including backward-looking desert-based reasons, 
and forward-looking reasons concerned with improving moral agency. But crucially, 
a further set of reasons should be considered in determining whether praise should 
be apportioned: reasons to do with challenging and dismantling oppression. This 
 
17 I think there are some concerns with Ciurria’s (2019, 18) proposal of moving away 
from some of the “agency tracking” aspects of our practices of moral responsibility, 
especially with respect to blame. But these concerns are less applicable to praise, 
since our practices of praise are often geared towards cultivating, rather than 
tracking, moral agency. On the other hand, however, it is important that, in levelling 
up praise, appraisals are not done purely for pragmatic reasons but in actual 
recognition of merit (these might be merits instantiated in cultivating moral agency, 
or in showing excellences of it). A related anecdotal insight: after delivering this 
paper, audience members have reported finding subsequent instances of praising 
weird, finding that they have to take pains to emphasise that it is genuine and not 
just for the sake of “levelling up” esteem. This relates to the concerns with using 
praise to shape behaviour articulated in 4.b. 
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means that we should (a) praise contributions to ending oppression18 and (b) reform 
our practices of praise so that they themselves serve emancipatory goals. What 
would this proposal look like, specifically? 
Looking back at our examples, in the case of the “daddy dividend,” the 
problem was diagnosed as there being unjustifiable inequities in praise and esteem, 
and that these are grounded in asymmetrical expectations about men’s and 
women’s roles in parenting. An ameliorated system of praising, focused on ending 
oppression, would readjust these expectations, such that men are not judged and 
praised in relation to the stereotype-informed low standard (much less rewarded for 
their performance in relation to it). Instead, expectations would be modified to be 
consistent with emancipatory goals: holding men to higher, and perhaps women to 
lower, expectations. And, as suggested above, social institutions and structures 
beyond practices of responsibility would also need reshaping to support this. 
Moreover, the genuine merits of women who parent would be recognised and 
esteemed rather than ignored, devalued or, worse, penalised. 
In our current, nonideal world, what might the first steps towards 
ameliorating praise be? To avoid entrenching problematic stereotypes and 
perpetuating inequities of esteem, we could either level up, level down, or 
redistribute praise. One might think that praise is not a finite resource—in principle, 
we could just generate more praise to go around. Perhaps that is sometimes 
possible, and when it is, that may be desirable. In that instance, levelling up might 
seem like a good option, since (as noted in sections 3.a and 3.b) there are some 
desert-based and forward-looking considerations that may speak in favour of 
praising men who, in current circumstances, work against gender norms to 
participate more fully in parenting. The problem is that women who parent are not 
in receipt of commensurate praise (either with their performance or with the praise 
men receive), and this should be rectified by elevating our appraisals of women’s 
contributions to parenting and merits thereby demonstrated. However, in practice, 
given constraints on time, energy, and attention, praise may turn out to be a finite 
resource. If so, levelling up is not a realistic option. If practices of praise are 
responsive to reasons of moral worth, encouraging moral sensitivity, and 
challenging oppression, then careful consideration is needed about what would best 
serve the balance of these reasons.19 Given the devaluation of women’s care, and 
other available means for encouraging men to participate in parenting, my view is 
 
18 This is one of the goals of our responsibility system; I am sympathetic to the idea 
that our practices of moral appraisal may have plural goals, of which emancipation is 
just one. 
19 See considerations raised in sections 3.a and 3.b. 
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that redistributing praise seems to me the best option here: women, rather than 
men, should be praised.20 
In the dynamics revealed in Heilman and Chen’s studies, the problem was 
diagnosed as there being unjustifiable inequities in praise and esteem grounded in 
the stereotype-informed asymmetrical expectations of men and women with 
respect to service—how women are routinely expected to be more helpful to others 
than men. An ameliorated system of praising would work with modified 
expectations about helpfulness, and judgements of merit and esteem would track 
whether those egalitarian—rather than stereotype-informed—expectations are 
met. Thus, when women display altruism, this would be recognised and rewarded 
appropriately. 
In our current nonideal world, working towards ameliorated praise here 
seems to require redistributing praise. In the sorts of contexts Heilman and Chen’s 
studies speak to—workplace evaluations—the role of praise is to inform ordinal 
rankings and the distribution of organisational reward. Levelling up is clearly not 
possible here (not everyone can be employee of the month, or get the bonus or 
promotion). This seems like the sort of case, then, in which corrective measures are 
needed—acknowledgement of the discriminatory patterns of appraisal, and explicit 
determinations to rectify these to avoid entrenching problematic norms, unjust 
distributions of positions of esteem, and attendant material goods. And, in some 
instances, ensuring that women get proper esteem and standing will mean that men 
get less. 
In the case of superficial allies (the strategic socialist feminists and the 
recently arrived white allies), the problem was diagnosed as there being 
unjustifiable inequities in praise and esteem grounded in the asymmetrical 
expectations of men and women, and of white people and people of colour, 
regarding their involvement in—and how much they are expected to sacrifice for—
movements for social justice. An ameliorated system of praise would modify 
expectations of would-be allies, holding them to higher standards. Moreover, the 
contributions and work of those who sacrifice much in these movements—for 
example, Crystal Eastman and Ida Rauh, in the case of the socialist feminists; Alicia 
Garza, Opal Tometi, and Patrisse Cullors, cofounders of the BLM US movement; 
Joshua Virasami of BLM UK;21 and Tyrek Morris, cofounder of the youth-led All Black 
 
20 This would need to be done carefully though, to avoid valorisations of women’s 
care that reinforce stereotypes of women as “nurturers” or “natural mothers.” 
21 As reported, though, many of the cofounders and leaders of BLM UK remain 
anonymous for fear of far right and police harassment. See Cole (2020) and 
McIntosh (2020). 
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Lives UK—would be rendered more visible, recognised, and appropriate esteem and 
admiration afforded to them. 
In our nonideal current context, working towards ameliorated praise seems 
to require both explicit acknowledgement and resolve to address discriminatory 
patterns of appraisal, as well as—perhaps for strategic reasons, in some contexts—
withholding praise from feminist men or white people allied to the movements.22 
Given the role that discriminatory appraisals can play in entrenching problematic 
distributions of recognition and esteem, allies would surely recognise that their 
praiseworthiness—to the degree that they are—does not take priority over 
remedying the problems of ill-distributed esteem or high regard and the material 
rewards that often track these. 
Ameliorated practices of praise would work to make visible the problematic 
stereotypes underpinning existing practices of praising; to readjust expectations 
towards more equitable goals, and to distribute praise—judgements of merit and 
expressions of esteem—accordingly. I have suggested that working towards an 
ameliorated practice of praise, in our current nonideal context, requires case-by-
case consideration of how best to address unequal expectations and inequitable 
distributions of praise. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I hope to have shed light on an aspect of the literature on moral 
responsibility that has received little attention—the ethics of praise. Whilst there 
has been much attention to blame, including more recently to its oppressive 
aspects, my aim was to show that an ethics of praise is much needed, and in 
particular, that any approach to evaluating our practices of praising needs to 
recognise the ways that oppressive dynamics shape this part of our responsibility 
system.  
This work points to broader, challenging theoretical questions about 
philosophical approaches to moral responsibility. If our practices are systematically 
unjust and shaped by oppressive social hierarchies, then there is work to be done in 
considering carefully the implications of this for approaches to moral responsibility 
that take our social practices as a key part of their methodological and justificatory 
framework (e.g., Strawson 1974; Wallace 1994; McGeer 2019). 
 
22 The sorts of contexts I have in mind as exceptions may be ones where, e.g., 
feminist men or antiracist white people support each other’s participation in the 
movement and consolidate motivations to participate, but where any praise 
communicated is carefully pitched to ensure it does not entrench problematic 
dynamics (of “saviourism”, e.g.). 
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However, my focus here has been principally on the reasons that might 
structure our practices of praise, and how those practices might be ameliorated to 
address “the praise gap”. As long as our expectations are shaped by gender 
oppression, racism, ableism, and other vectors of oppression, our practices of praise 
are vulnerable to distortion. They may entrench problematic norms, misinform 
structures of recognition and reward, and shape moral agency in oppressive ways. In 
response, we might instead tailor our practices of praise to serve emancipatory 
goals, praising strivings towards those goals, and using praise itself in a manner 
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